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ABSTRACT
Population ageing is a major global challenge. The Latin American economies have a younger 
population structure than other emerging and advanced economies, which has allowed them to 
enjoy the so-called demographic dividend (a favourable working age/non-working age population 
ratio). However, according to the latest demographic projections of the United Nations (UN), it is 
estimated that in 2020 the Latin American population pyramid will resemble that of the advanced 
economies in 1990 and that, by around 2050, both groups will have similar population profiles. 
This article documents the current demographic trends in Latin America and discusses the main 
related challenges, in particular, those arising from the adaptation of social welfare systems to 
population ageing.
Keywords: demographic dividend, ageing, pension systems, dependency ratio, total factor 
productivity.
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Introduction
Population ageing is a major global challenge. In recent decades, the analysis of this 
phenomenon and its economic consequences has focused on the advanced 
economies. In contrast, the emerging countries enjoyed the so-called demographic 
dividend.1 This refers to the potential benefits of a population structure in which the 
younger generations have a larger share, leading to a favourable working age/non-
working age population ratio. The economic literature documents how, when these 
generations are educated and incorporated into the labour market, growth, economic 
development and the sustainability of public finances improve.
In the case of Latin America the window of opportunity to benefit from this 
demographic dividend is closing. According to the latest demographic projections 
of the United Nations (UN), the speed of ageing projected for this region over the 
next three decades is greater than for other economies, such as the European ones. 
Against this background, this article documents the current demographic trends in 
Latin America, from a global perspective. It presents the main challenges associated 
with these trends, which the advanced economies have already been facing for 
some time. In particular, it focuses on the challenges for pension systems, which in 
Latin America have particular characteristics, and also a high degree of cross-
country heterogeneity.
Demographic drivers in Latin America
Over the past six decades, Latin America has recorded an ongoing decline in the 
share of the younger generations (the under-14s), measured as a percentage of the 
working-age population, while the percentage of elderly persons (the over-65s)2 has 
trended upwards (see Chart 1). These trends have been seen in all regions of the 
world, but their rates have been especially pronounced in Latin America and Asia. 
THE END OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC DIVIDEND IN LATIN AMERICA: CHALLENGES 
FOR ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL POLICIES
1  See Bloom et al. (2003).
2  The inverse of this latter indicator – the number of potential workers for each person over the age of 65 – is also 
used in the literature.
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The dependency ratio in Latin America is at a low level, owing to the fall in the fertility rate. However, this situation is not projected to last. 
According to current demographic projections, Latin America will face similar population ageing to that seen in the advanced economies, 
which will lead to an increase in the dependency ratio.
DEPENDENCY RATIO
Chart 1
SOURCE: Authors' calculations, based on UN data.
a South and Central American countries (UN classification, which includes Mexico in the latter group) with at least one million inhabitants 
in 2019.
b South and South-East Asian countries (UN classification) with at least one million inhabitants in 2019.
c African countries with at least one million inhabitants in 2019.
d High income countries according to the World Bank classification with at least one million inhabitants in 2019.
e Eastern European countries (UN classification) with at least one million inhabitants in 2019.
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According to the UN’s projections, these dynamics are expected to continue, 
especially in Latin America. The population structure of this region is currently similar 
to that of the world as a whole (see Chart 2), as compared with a much younger 
structure in the 1950s, when it was similar to that of the African continent. However, 
it is estimated that the population pyramid of Latin America in 2020 will be similar to 
those of the advanced economies in the 1990s and, according to the projections 
available, these two groups of countries will have similar population profiles by 2050.
As in other areas of the world, population ageing in Latin America is primarily a 
consequence of a fall in fertility and an increase in life expectancy over the past six 
decades (see Chart 3.1). In Latin America, moreover, the demographic transition has 
been boosted by a higher relative incidence of net population outflows (see Chart 3.2), 
and an emigration profile that has tended to be based on younger, working-age population 
strata (see Chart 3.3). Although net emigration has fallen in recent years, relative to the 
final decades of the twentieth century, net population outflows have, on aggregate, 
continued to be more significant in Latin America than in the rest of the world.3
Also as in other areas of the world, the fall in fertility in Latin America was accompanied 
by the incorporation of women into the labour market. The female participation rate in 
In 2020, the Latin American population pyramid will be very similar to the one for the world as a whole, while the African one will display larger 
differences than in 1950 since it is the only region in which the dependency ratio is still falling.
POPULATION STRUCTURES
Chart 2
SOURCE: UN.
a The population pyramids depicted in the charts show the structure by age group (as a percentage of the total population) in the region 
and in the world.
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3  The decline in population growth may also involve an increase in immigration into the region, especially in the 
cases of Brazil and Mexico (See Campos (2017)).
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the region has doubled since the 1960s (see Chart 4.1), offsetting the downward trend 
in the male participation rate (see Chart 4.2). However, in recent decades, the rate of 
incorporation of women into the labour market has slowed and, in most of the 
countries of the region, the female participation rate has reached levels close to those 
in advanced countries, which may indicate that this transition is coming to an end.
The challenges of ageing
The faster demographic transition projected for Latin America means that the region 
will have less time to adapt to the consequences of ageing. This phenomenon has 
The increase in life expectancy, fall in fertility and migratory flows are the main factors driving ageing. Life expectancy has increased 
drastically over the last 60 years, especially in the emerging countries. In recent years, net emigration has declined in the region (except in 
Venezuela, for idiosyncratic reasons). However, emigrants are predominantly young people.
DEMOGRAPHIC DRIVERS OF AGEING
Chart 3
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on World Bank, UN and OECD data.
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significant effects on economies’ aggregate supply and demand, and on 
macroeconomic and social policies. As explained in Banco de España (2019), 
demographic changes affect household consumption, business investment, 
employment, productivity and wage and price-setting processes. These changes 
affect the efficacy of monetary and fiscal policies, because, on one hand, the lower 
growth of the working-age population makes it more likely that real interest rates will 
remain low, while on the other hand, both the level and the composition of public 
spending and revenues depend on the age structure of the population.
Latin America is growing at a slower pace than the other emerging regions, partly owing to the absence of total factor productivity growth. 
The transition involving the incorporation of women into the labour market seems to have come to an end.
POTENTIAL GROWTH AND DETERMINANTS
Chart 4
SOURCES: IMF, UN and own calculations drawing on Penn World Table 9.1 data.
a Latin America-6: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru. Weighted by purchasing power parity.
b To estimate potential growth, the IMF forecast available at the time for the longest term (five years) was used for each year.
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These demographic trends may aggravate a situation in which the region’s economic 
growth (only 1.4% in annual average terms over the last five years) and potential 
growth are already low relative to other emerging regions, partly due to scant 
productivity growth (see Charts 4.3 and 4.4). Here, it is essential to point out that 
Latin American labour markets are characterised by a large informal sector, which 
accounts for more than 50% of total employment, with a high degree of heterogeneity 
across countries, and by their rigid regulation. The first characteristic tends to 
smooth the adjustment of the economies to shocks, but hampers productivity 
growth, while the latter has a negative impact on their potential growth, according to 
the evidence available  (David et al., 2020). 
Against a background of increasing spending pressure associated with population 
ageing, the weak potential growth and the characteristics of the Latin American 
labour market pose significant challenges to the ability to raise extra revenue through 
the tax system. As to social policies, it should be noted that the need for spending 
on pension, health and long-term care systems is directly related to the size of the 
older population, a structural factor that exerts pressure on public spending.
Pension expenditure in Latin America
According to the economic literature, pension system coverage is one of the main 
challenges posed by population ageing, on account of its importance for fiscal 
sustainability. In the case of Latin America, the arguments that feature in the debate 
taking place in advanced economies – especially in Europe, where the debate has 
been most active –cannot be directly extrapolated as there is no single pension 
system model in place in the region. 
In 1981 a reform was approved in Chile that completely replaced the pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) public pension system4 with an individually-funded system administered by 
the private sector.5 This reform, which has given rise to a lengthy transition period in 
which both systems co-exist, was very influential in the region and various other 
countries introduced an individually-funded system, either as a main component of 
their pension system (Mexico in 1997) or to complement the traditional PAYG system 
(Peru in 1993, Colombia in 1994). The latter option is generally known as the parallel 
4   Under  the  PAYG  system,  contributions made  to  the  pension  system  fund  current  pension  benefits  and  also 
guarantee  the  rights  of  future  beneficiaries whose pensions will  be  funded with  the  contributions  of  the  new 
generations.  This  is  a  state-run  system  based  on  both  inter-  and  intra-generational  transfers,  with  benefits 
determined by law (the replacement rate, access requirements and adjustability of pensions are generally 
stipulated). Contributions are also set by law and may be borne by workers, employers and the State.
5  The individually-funded system has the following characteristic features: i) a funded system based on individual 
accounts; ii) the pension funds and individual accounts are mainly privately run but may also be run by the State; 
iii) benefits are funded by the capital built up in individual accounts, with no replacement rates determined by law 
(in other words, benefits depend on each individual’s ability to save and on the returns obtained on the funds); and 
iv) contributions are determined by law.
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model, in which workers have to choose between the public PAYG system and the 
individually-funded system. Among the countries that have a PAYG public pension 
system, Argentina6 and Brazil stand out. Both these countries have recently 
introduced reforms (Brazil in 2019 and Argentina in 2017) and Argentina is currently 
discussing further reforms. In general, these reforms set stricter conditions for 
retirement and adjusted benefits (replacement rates),7 seeking to address the ageing 
problem and to strike a balance between sufficient coverage and benefits, on one 
hand, and financial sustainability, on the other. In the specific case of Brazil, the 
most notable aspects of the latest reform are the increase in the retirement age and 
in the number of years of contributions required, and making workers’ social security 
contributions progressive.
However, individually-funded systems are chiefly designed for the segment of the 
population who have formal, stable employment, receive medium-high incomes 
and make contributions most of their working life, and this is not generally the 
case of workers in Latin American countries, given the significance of informal 
labour markets and the low density of contributions in the formal ones (see 
Chart  5.1). In consequence, there is a certain degree of consensus among 
analysts8 that individually-funded pension systems based on individual ability to 
save have not produced the desired results in terms of coverage and sufficiency 
of benefits.
Accordingly, some Latin American countries have recently reformed their pension 
systems by reinforcing public funding, to narrow the gap between the beneficiaries 
of the pension system insofar as coverage and quality of benefits are concerned. 
For instance, the reform of the Chilean pension system in 2008, which created an 
integrated model consisting of a minimum base and individually-funded systems, 
entails a return to a pension system administered and funded by the State. The 
recent social unrest in Chile has reopened the debate about potential reform of the 
pension system, highlighting the creation of new solidarity mechanisms such as, for 
example, the proposal to increase the employer contribution rate by 5 pp (from 10% 
to 15%), to create a solidarity fund to boost current and future pensions via inter- 
and intra-generational transfers.9 This places pressure on public spending, owing 
to the need to reinforce and extend the coverage of non-contributory schemes and 
to complement contributory pensions in order to achieve minimum sufficiency 
levels. 
6  In 1994 an integrated model was introduced in Argentina, so named because it included a universal solidarity 
base that was part of the pension system. In 2008 the individually-funded system was eliminated, leaving just the 
state-run PAYG system.
7   The replacement rate is defined as the amount of a person’s pension as a percentage of his/her last wage before 
retirement.
8  See, for example, Arenas de Mesa (2019) and some of the works referenced there.
9  By contrast, in Mexico, there have been no subsequent major changes and the main changes made have been 
focused on the non-contributory pension system, resulting in increased coverage for over-65s with non-
contributory pension schemes.
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Since 1995, pension expenditure as a percentage of GDP has doubled in Latin America (weighted average of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico) owing to the greater generosity of the pension systems and the increase in the dependency ratio. If the other determinants were to
remain unchanged, the growth in the dependency ratio projected by the UN alone would push pension expenditure in the region up to 15% 
of GDP in 2050.
AGEING DRIVES UP PENSION SYSTEM EXPENDITURE IN LATIN AMERICA
Chart 5
SOURCES: Own calculations, with data from World Bank, ECLAC, UN, OECD, Penn World Tables 9.1, IMF and national welfare systems.
a Aggregate of Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Mexico.
b Measures the contribution to pension expenditure/GDP of the wage share of GDP.
c Measures the contribution to pension expenditure/GDP of the change in the employment rate (employed population to working-age 
population).
d Measures the contribution to pension expenditure/GDP of the change in the dependency ratio (population over 65 to working-age 
population).
e Measures the contribution to pension expenditure/GDP of the change in the product of the benefit rate (ratio of average pension to 
average wage) and the coverage ratio (percentage of population over 65 receiving a pension).
f Cumulative percentage change in ratio of pension expenditure to GDP, measured as the log difference compared with the 1995 figure.
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Table 1 presents the key characteristics of public pension systems in the countries 
with the largest economies in Latin America.10 Despite the progress made with the 
latest reforms, there is still a large gap between the level and quality of coverage 
of the pension systems in Latin America and those of the OECD countries. In 2017, 
for example,11 only 45% of the labour force in the region as a whole contributed to 
a pension system (see Chart 5.4), compared with the OECD average of close to 
80%. This means that more than half the current labour force may need some 
kind of financial supplement or support from the State in their old age to avoid 
falling below the poverty line. In turn, 76% of the over-65s were receiving a pension 
in 2017; this is an increase of almost 25 pp compared with the year 2000, but still 
considerably lower than the average of the OECD countries (close to 95%). 
Moreover, partly owing to their sharp growth in recent years, non-contributory 
pension systems account for 30% of coverage of pensioners in Latin America. 
Judging the quality of this coverage, as measured by the replacement rate, is not 
straightforward in individually-funded systems. However, according to the 
10   Although they are not included in Table 1, Costa Rica, Panama and Uruguay all have mixed models, i.e. pensions 
are funded mainly through the public PAYG system, complemented by an individually-funded system that may 
be public or private.
11  See Arenas de Mesa (2019).
CHARACTERISTICS OF PUBLIC PENSION SYSTEMS IN VARIOUS LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES
Table 1
SOURCES: IDB (2019), Arenas de Mesa (2019), IMF, OECD, national sources and UN demographic projections.
a Dependency ratio in 2018, on UN population data. The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of the sum of the dependent population (over-65s 
and under-16s) to the working-age population (16-65 age group).
b Pension systems may have different pillars in different countries, according to how contributions and benefits are calculated, i.e. defined benefit (DB) 
when benefits are determined ex ante or defined contribution (DC) when contributions are fixed but benefits may vary. In some countries the two 
systems overlap; in these cases the parameters of the different calculations are separated by a "/" sign. Brazil has a dual calculation model, based 
on retirement age and years of contributions. The contribution rate is defined as the percentage of income (see IDB (2019)). The replacement rate 
is the percentage of last salary received as income in retirement: the simple average between married men and women.
c The Brazilian National Congress recently approved a reform of the pension system that maintains its status as a public benefit system. It raises 
the minimum retirement age to 62 for women and 65 for men, and the minimum number of years of contributions to 20 for men and women. It 
also unifies workers’ social security contributions, introducing a progressive scale, and places upper and lower limits on contributory pensions.
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Public pension 
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Argentina 55.9
PAYG
(2008)
DB/DC 60 65 56.2 92.5 23.7 30 80 (DB) 8.9
Peru 50.7
Parallel
(1993)
DB/DC 65/65 65/65 26.9 48.8 13/10 20/20
47 (DB)/
73 (DC)
1.5
Chile 45.7
Integrated
(2008)
DC 60 65 63.4 87.0 10 — 38 (DC) 2.8
Colombia 45.7
Parallel
(1994)
DB/DC 57/57 62/62 30.5 45.7 16/11.5 26 44 (DC) 4.1
Mexico 45.7
Private
(1997)
DB/DC 65/65 65/65 36.3 81.6 8.1/6.3 10/25 107 (DB) 2.3
Brazil (c) 43.4
PAYG Age/Years of
contributions
60/55 65/50 58.0 86.9
28-31
(both)
15/35 80 (age) 11.0
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literature,12 coverage quality is generally higher in PAYG systems than in 
individually-funded ones.
As Chart 5.2 shows, in recent decades public pension expenditure in Latin America13 
has gradually risen as a percentage of GDP, doubling between 1995 and 2016 (see 
Chart  5.2). To understand the reasons for this increase, we decompose pension 
expenditure (expressed as a percentage of GDP) into its determinants. Pension 
expenditure depends positively on the dependency ratio (population over 65 to 
working-age population), negatively on the employment rate (employed population 
to working-age population) and positively on the wage share of GDP and the 
generosity of the pension system (which in turn is the product of the coverage ratio 
(percentage of population over 65 receiving a pension) and the benefit rate (ratio of 
average pension to average wage)). This is expressed in the following equation:14
Pension expenditure/GDP =  Dependency ratio × Coverage ratio × Benefit rate × 
Wage share of GDP / Employment rate
As Chart 5.3 shows, in Latin America public pension expenditure rose between 1995 
and 2005 mainly on account of the increased generosity of the pension system, 
owing either to a higher public coverage ratio or a higher benefit rate. However, since 
2005 the higher dependency ratio has been the main driver of the increase in 
expenditure. Likewise, public pension expenditure is expected to continue to grow 
owing to ageing of the region’s population. 
Chart 5.4 sets out the result of a simulation of pension expenditure, assuming the 
increase in the dependency ratio projected by the UN while keeping all other 
determinants unchanged at their present levels.15 According to this simulation, public 
pension expenditure could increase from around 6% of GDP in 2020 to 15% in 2050. 
It is expected, therefore, that governments will continue to reform their pension 
systems, to address the challenges of the demographic transition facing the region. 
13.2.2020.
12  See Arenas de Mesa (2019) and the works cited there.
13   Aggregate of the region’s four economies for which there are complete data available (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Mexico).
14   The lack of uniform data for Latin America makes it impossible to calculate the coverage ratio and the benefit rate 
separately, which is why the analysis focuses on the product of the two, which measures the generosity of the 
pension system.
15  In the simulation the coverage ratio is constant. If it were to rise in the future, as it has in recent years, this would 
pose an additional challenge.
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